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Abstract (1905 characters; 2000 limit) 
Seagrass ecosystems provide numerous ecosystem services that support coastal communities around 
the world. They sustain abundant marine life as well as commercial and artisanal fisheries, and help 
protect shorelines from coastal erosion. Additionally, seagrass meadows are a globally significant 
sink for carbon and represent a key ecosystem for combating climate change. However, seagrass 
habitats are suffering rapid global decline. Despite recognition of the importance of ‘Blue Carbon’, 
no functioning seagrass restoration or conservation projects supported by carbon finance currently 
operate, and the policies and frameworks to achieve this have not been developed. Yet, seagrass 
ecosystems could play a central role in addressing important international research questions 
regarding the natural mechanisms through which the ocean and the seabed can mitigate climate 
change, and how ecosystem structure links to service provision.  The relative inattention that 
seagrass ecosystems have received represents both a serious oversight and a major missed 
opportunity. In this paper we review the prospects of further inclusion of seagrass ecosystems in 
climate policy frameworks, with a particular focus on carbon storage and sequestration, as well as 
the potential for developing payment for ecosystem service (PES) schemes that are complementary 
to carbon management. Prospects for the inclusion of seagrass Blue Carbon in regulatory 
compliance markets are currently limited; yet despite the risks the voluntary carbon sector offers the 
most immediately attractive avenue for the development of carbon credits. Given the array of 
ecosystem services seagrass ecosystems provide the most viable route to combat climate change, 
ensure seagrass conservation and improve livelihoods may be to complement any carbon payments 
with seagrass PES schemes based on the provision of additional ecosystem services. 
Keywords: Blue Carbon, carbon sequestration, coastal management, marine conservation, 
payments for ecosystem services, poverty alleviation  
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1 Introduction 1 
Seagrasses represent a diverse and globally distributed group of aquatic flowering plants 2 
(angiosperms) with up to 76 species occurring in  boreal, temperate, and tropical waters (Green and 3 
Short 2003). Seagrass meadows are commonly dominated by a single species, although in tropical 4 
regions meadows comprising 12 distinct species have been recorded. They are often significant or 5 
dominant primary producers, supporting local food-webs and driving local nutrient cycles (Hoard et 6 
al., 1989; Gullstrom et al. 2008; Hemming and Duarte 2000). Seagrass meadows are primarily 7 
adapted to coastal environments where their spatial distribution is heavily influenced by 8 
environmental factors such as light, temperature, salinity, nutrient availability and wave action 9 
(Hemming and Duarte 2000). However, the shallow coastal habitat colonized by most seagrass 10 
meadows means they are especially prone to significant human-related disturbance (Waycott et al. 11 
2009).  12 
Human actions provide a triumvirate of environmental, biological and climatological 13 
stressors that act across spatial and temporal scales delivering locally-specific impacts (Orth et al. 14 
2006). Drivers of seagrass ecosystem decline include: eutrophication and solid waste disposal 15 
(nutrient pollution); aquaculture; thermal pollution; physical alteration or habitat damage (via 16 
dredging, coastal infrastructural developments, land reclamation and mechanical destruction); 17 
disease spread and invasive species introductions; climate change; over-fishing; overexploitation; 18 
and land-runoff from deforestation, mining and agriculture (Duarte 2002; Erftemeijer and Robin 19 
Lewis III 2006; Orth et al. 2006; Waycott et al. 2009; Short et al. 2011; Zuidema et al. 2011; Hicks 20 
and McClanahan 2012; Cullen-Unsworth and Unsworth 2013; Cullen-Unsworth et al. 2013; Baker 21 
et al. 2014).  22 
Over several decades the global integrity of seagrass ecosystems has been seriously 23 
undermined by business-as-usual approaches to coastal development (Duarte 2002). Occurrences 24 
fuelled by increasing population densities in coastal regions, which are about three times higher 25 
than the global average and increasing (Small and Nicholls 2003).  In some cases rapid population 26 
growth and urban expansion has shifted farming practices towards increased agricultural output 27 
leading to the persistent eutrophication of coastal lagoons and reduced seagrass biomass (Rivera-28 
Guzmań et al. 2013).  Similarly, nutrient loading and sedimentation have markedly reduced the 29 
extent of several seagrass meadow sites in the Western Pacific (Short et al. 2014).  30 
Globally, twenty four percent of seagrass species are now classified as threatened or near 31 
threatened on the IUCN’s Red List (Short et al. 2011). Estimates of the rate of seagrass decline have 32 
increased over the last 70 years, from 0.9% yr
-1
 prior to 1940 rising to 7% yr
-1
 since 1980 (Waycott 33 
et al. 2009; Duarte et al. 2013a; Fourqurean et al. 2012).  The global decline of seagrass ecosystems 34 
threatens to exacerbate climate change (Duarte et al. 2010; Kennedy et al. 2010; Fourqurean et al. 35 
2012; Lavery et al. 2013), undermine the supply of a range of other ecosystem services (Bujang et 36 
al. 2006; Orth et al. 2006; Waycott et al. 2009; Short et al. 2011; Cullen-Unsworth and Unsworth 37 
2013) and consequently detrimentally affect subsistence livelihoods (Cullen and Unsworth 2010; 38 
Nordlund et al. 2010).  39 
This reality reflects the complexity of seagrass ecosystems, particularly the connections 40 
seagrass meadows have with marine and terrestrial systems, and therefore the difficulties and 41 
challenges associated with their management, which are embedded within broader coastal and 42 
ocean management issues (Rudd and Lawton 2013). For example, in a recent global ocean research 43 
priorities exercise (Rudd 2014) several top-ranked priorities had implications for seagrass 44 
ecosystems, including: ‘greenhouse gas flux’ (7th); ‘climate change mitigation and manipulation’ 45 
(8th); ‘ecosystem structure to service linkages’ (16th); ‘upland hydrology effects on oceans’ (24th); 46 
‘coastal hazard management’ (35th); ‘ecosystem management alternatives’ (40th) and ‘integrated 47 
upland coastal management’ (43rd). Our view is that research is needed on multiple fronts to create 48 
enabling conditions and the evidence base needed to craft innovative new policy tools for 49 
conservation and mitigating the potential adverse effects of climate change. 50 
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Our purpose here is to summarize the prospects for using new approaches to aid seagrass 51 
conservation. This will help address key coastal and ocean research questions, and provide 52 
substantive direction on future seagrass research needs. We address these issues in the context of 53 
incorporating seagrass habitats into climate change mitigation strategies jointly focused on 54 
ecosystem service provision, carbon management and livelihood support. In particular, we analyse 55 
prospective financing options in relation to carbon management, alongside other investment 56 
opportunities for including seagrass meadows into incentive-based mechanisms (e.g., PES) through 57 
a co-benefit and bundled ecosystem service approach. In so doing we consider science, policy and 58 
governance perspectives acknowledging the important barriers and challenges existing across those 59 
domains.  60 
We examine five key issues. In Section 2, we summarize ecosystem services (ES) provided 61 
by seagrass ecosystems and the salient information needed concerning these ES to develop 62 
incentive schemes. In Section 3, we ask how ecosystem service valuation information could be 63 
applied to design and implement new policy innovations. In Section 4, we examine the prospects 64 
for seagrass carbon finance based on current climate policy frameworks. In Section 5, we broaden 65 
the scope to financing instruments that could be developed based on the multiple ES that seagrass 66 
ecosystems provide. Lastly, in Section 6, we summarize the key design, implementation and 67 
governance issues that must be addressed to bring functioning seagrass PES schemes to fruition. In 68 
addition, we highlight the relevant ocean priority research questions that relate to each stage (Rudd 69 
2014), setting our seagrass-oriented research in the broader context of ocean research prioritization. 70 
2  Seagrass ecosystems and ecosystem services 71 
Seagrass ecosystems provide supporting, regulating, provisioning, and cultural ecosystem 72 
services (Barbier et al. 2011; Raheem et al. 2012; Cullen-Unsworth and Unsworth 2013). Here we 73 
briefly summarize the literature regarding the most widely cited ES supplied by seagrass 74 
ecosystems and the information required about each in order to include them in an incentive 75 
mechanism (Table 1).  76 
 
Table 1 Seagrass ecosystem services and the corresponding information needed to contribute 
towards incentive scheme development 
Ecosystem Service What we need to know
a 
Climate regulation (carbon 
storage and sequestration)  
(a) The spatial distribution, density and species assemblage of seagrass meadows. Two 
relatively accurate and reliable means of achieving this are:  
 Acoustic side scan sonar which is useful up to 25m depths and has been used to 
map seagrass communities in the Mediterranean (e.g., Montelfalcone et al. 
2013; Sanchez-Carnero et al. 2012). 
 Remote sensing, for example, Landsat 5 TM and 7 Enhanced Thematic Mapper,  
which is more appropriate for shallow waters of between 2 to 5m and has been 
used in Australia (e.g., Dekker et al. 2005; Phinn et al. 2008), Zanzibar (e.g., 
Gullström et al. 2006) and the Coral Triangle (Torres-Pulliza et al. 2014) 
(b) Assessment of carbon stocks, rate of accumulation (e.g., Duarte et al. 2013a; 
Fourqurean et al. 2012; Macreadie et al. 2013), in particular: 
 Belowground biomass and soil: soil depth (thickness of deposit), dry bulk 
density and organic carbon content (Duarte et al. 1998; Fourqurean et al. 2012)  
 Aboveground biomass: represents only ~0.3% of total organic carbon stock 
(Duarte and Chiscano 1999) 
 Accumulation rate: direct measurement, radiocarbon, 210Pb, soil elevation 
(Duarte et al. 2013a) 
 
Erosion and natural hazard 
regulation (coastal and 
shoreline protection) 
(a) Local vegetative characteristics such as canopy height, shoot density and below-
ground biomass (e.g., Bouma and Amos, 2012; Christiansen et al. 2013; Ondiviela et al. 
2013) 
(b) Bulk density, organic content of sediment and porosity (e.g., de Boer 2007) 
 
 
Biodiversity (a) Species inventory, richness, diversity and community structure (e.g., Bell and 
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Pollard, 1989; Barnes 2013) 
(b) Habitat usage of fish species and correlations with life-cycle stages (e.g., Heck, 2003; 
Jaxion-Harm et al. 2012; Seitz et al. 2014) 
(c) Presence of charismatic and Red List species (e.g., Williams and Heck Jr, 2001) 
 
Fisheries (a) Fish species caught, landed and sold (e.g., average catch sizes, market value etc.) 
(b) Frequency, location(s) and time spent fishing, for example, by using participatory 
GIS (e.g., Baldwin, Mahon & McConney 2013; Baldwin & Oxenford 2014) 
(c) Degree of overlap between commercial and artisanal fish species (i.e. commercial 
fishing impacts on artisanal fishing activities) 
(d) Types of fishing methods and gear employed and their capacity to damage seagrass 
beds (e.g., Tudela, 2004) 
(e) Invertebrate gleaning activities (e.g., species gleaned, frequency of gleaning etc. 
Unsworth and Cullen, 2010) 
 
Nutrient cycling and water 
quality Regulation 
(a) Seagrass biomass and production (e.g., de Boer, 2007) 
(b) Levels of leaf litter (e.g., Chiu et al. 2013) 
(c) Water turbidity (e.g., Petus et al. 2014) 
(d) Dissolved nutrient concentration (e.g., Cabaco et al. 2013) 
 
Cultural services (tourism 
and recreation) 
(a) Hotels (coastal distribution and ownership of land) 
(b) Tourist numbers , demographics and usage of inshore areas (reasons for use) 
(c) Local employment of staff in tourism (community-based tourism e.g., Salazar 2012 
(Tanzania); Kibicho 2008; Steinicke and Neuburger 2012 (Kenya)) 
(d) Local food supply to hotels (e.g., Pillay and Rogerson 2012) 
(e) Associated infrastructure developments and impacts on seagrass meadow stability 
(e.g., Daby 2003 in Mauritias; Zuidema et al. 2011 Turks and Cacos Islands) 
 
Cultural services (social-
ecological) 
(a) Composition of household income and reliance on seagrass-derived ecosystem 
services 
(b) Gender differences in use and benefits derived from seagrass meadows e.g., gleaning 
vs. fishing (e.g., Cullen-Unsworth et al. 2013) 
(c) Cultural significance of seagrass meadows to ‘traditional way of life’ (e.g., Unsworth 
and Cullen, 2010 
 
Ecosystem Service Threats (a) Agricultural land run-off : nutrient loading (e.g., Waycott et al. 2009) 
(b) Coastal developments  and population and urban impacts: infrastructure, conversion 
of seagrass meadow beds to alternative uses, sewage discharge (e.g., Short et al. 2011; 
2014) 
 77 
 78 
 79 
 80 
2.1 Regulating services: climate regulation 81 
Historically, seagrass meadows had been virtually ignored in global carbon budgets (Duarte 82 
et al., 2005). More recently their role in combating climate change through carbon storage and 83 
sequestration has become more clearly recognised, while simultaneously the spatial extent of 84 
seagrass meadows has continued to decline (Duarte et al. 2010; Kennedy et al. 2010; Fourqurean et 85 
al. 2012; Duarte et al. 2013a; Lavery et al. 2013). Although a small fraction (18 to 60 x 10
6
 ha) of 86 
the world’s ocean area seagrass meadows sequester 20% of global marine carbon and store 10% of 87 
annual buried organic carbon (Corg) (Fourqurean et al. 2012; Pendleton et al. 2012). Consequently, 88 
seagrass ecosystems play potentially central roles in how oceanic ecosystems can mitigate climate 89 
change, a question ranked 8th in global importance by marine scientists (Rudd 2014).  90 
Seagrass meadows are highly productive systems, especially in Indo-Pacific regions, and 91 
provide habitat for diverse communities (Short et al. 2011). However, worldwide, seagrass standing 92 
biomass is small (76-151 Tg C) relative to the biomass of the vegetation in other coastal ecosystems 93 
(Fourqurean et al. 2012). Nonetheless, the high productivity of seagrass meadows, with potential 94 
a 
In relation to the information outlined three points need to be emphasised: First, it is not necessary to obtain detailed 
information on all ES provided by seagrasses to develop a payment scheme. Second, their needs to be agreement 
between the operating scale of the payment scheme and the scale at which ES information is acquired. Third, the 
information we list is not meant to be exhaustive. 
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net community production (NCP) of 6.7 t C ha
-1
 yr
-1
 (several times higher than NCP rates 95 
associated with Amazonian forests and North American wetlands), contributes significantly to their 96 
carbon sink capacity (Duarte et al. 2010). Approximately 20% to 60% of this aboveground 97 
productivity derives from the autotrophic epiphytes that seagrass meadows support (Duarte et al. 98 
2013a). Moreover, seagrass meadows trap allochthonous material, including large amounts of 99 
particulate carbon, which combined with their ability to bury carbon enables seagrass meadows to 100 
store large amounts of carbon (Duarte et al. 2013a).  101 
Carbon stored belowground, as dead roots and rhizomes and as Corg, may be stable for 102 
millennia (Duarte et al. 2010; 2013a). However, the amount of Corg locked beneath seagrass beds 103 
varies considerably according to the interplay of different abiotic and biotic drivers, with the result 104 
that in some cases deposits of organic-rich sediments beneath seagrass meadows can be up to 11m 105 
thick (Duarte et al. 2013a). In addition, most seagrass production (approximately 80%) is not 106 
consumed by herbivores and may therefore be buried, where a combination of low nutrient content 107 
and anoxic sediment conditions contributes to low rates of remineralization aiding long-term 108 
storage (Duarte et al. 2013a). Burial rates are therefore somewhat difficult to estimate; however, the 109 
most robust data suggests mean local Corg burial rates of 1.2-1.38 t C ha
-1
 yr
-1
: equivalent to 30-50% 110 
of NCP (Kennedy et al. 2010; Duarte et al. 2013b). Nevertheless, others (Siikamaki et al. 2013) 111 
have suggested a much lower burial rate, equivalent to 0.54 t C ha
-1
 yr
-1
. 112 
Globally, the organic carbon that accumulates in the sediments below seagrass meadows is 113 
much greater (4.2 to 8.4 Pg C) than the biomass (Fourqurean et al. 2012).  However, the areal extent 114 
of seagrass meadows is poorly mapped, meaning these estimates remain highly uncertain (Duarte et 115 
al. 2013b; Lavery et al. 2013). Further uncertainties arise from the fact that some 50% of below-116 
ground carbon derives from autochthonous production while almost 50% is contributed from 117 
phytoplankton and terrestrial sources (Kennedy et al. 2010; Duarte et al. 2013a). Indeed, significant 118 
quantities of carbon are also exported away from seagrass meadows to adjacent areas, although the 119 
fate of this carbon is poorly understood (Duarte et al. 2010; 2013a). 120 
Despite the uncertainties, alongside the lack of attention given to the potential implications 121 
of extensive conversion of standing carbon pools beneath vegetative coastal ecosystems more 122 
generally, it is clear that seagrass meadows constitute an important global carbon sink whose 123 
continued loss threatens to exacerbate climate change (Duarte et al. 2010; Pendleton et al. 2012). 124 
Indeed, global carbon emissions maybe enhanced by an additional 3% to 19% from the destruction 125 
of vegetative coastal ecosystems (Pendleton et al. 2012). Based on current assessments seagrass 126 
biomass loss may release between 11 and 23 Tg C yr
-1
 into the ocean-atmosphere system, and a 127 
further 63 to 297 Tg C yr
-1
 into the ocean-atmosphere CO2 reservoir through the oxidization of the 128 
underlying sediment (Fourqurean et al. 2012). Additionally, seagrass loss reduces the overall carbon 129 
accumulation rate (equivalent to between 6 and 24 Tg C yr
-1
). Collectively, this represents 130 
considerable CO2 emission potential (131 to 522 Mg CO2 ha
-1
), a figure comparable to roughly 10% 131 
of that emitted annually from land-use change, with associated economic costs approaching US$1.9 132 
to 13.7 billion yr
-1
 (Fourqurean et al. 2012; Pendleton et al. 2012).  133 
2.2 Regulating services: erosion and natural hazard regulation 134 
Coastal vegetated wetlands such as seagrass meadows can provide effective natural 135 
protection from the destructive powers of storms and wave action (Barbier et al. 2008; Bouma and 136 
Amos 2012; Duarte et al. 2013b). They are therefore important ecosystems to study in order to 137 
understand the spatial extent, frequency, and risk of marine hazards affecting coastal waters and 138 
how their effects can be minimized (ranked 35
th
 in Rudd, 2014). Direct coastal protection is 139 
achieved through energy dissipation resulting from wave breaking, friction and energy reflection 140 
(Ondiviela et al. 2013), processes significantly influenced by seagrass shoot density and canopy 141 
structure (Hansen and Reidenbach 2013). Even low biomass and heavily grazed seagrass meadows 142 
can significantly reduce wave action by decreasing the hydrodynamic energy associated with 143 
current flow (Christiansen et al. 2013). For example, in temperate regions current velocities have 144 
been reduced by up to 60% in summer (high biomass) compared to 40% in winter (low biomass) in 145 
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relation to adjacent non-vegetated sites (Hansen and Reidenbach 2013). By reducing wave action 146 
and current velocities seagrass habitats also protect the seafloor against hydrodynamic ‘shear 147 
stresses’ (de Boer 2007).  148 
Seagrass canopies act as efficient filters, stripping particles from the water column and 149 
adding to sediment accumulation (Hendriks et al. 2007). Soil accretion ( ~1.5mm yr
-1
) is important 150 
in helping coastal wetlands, and seagrass meadows in particular, adapt to sea level rise (Kirwan and 151 
Megonigal 2013; Lavery et al. 2013), thus contributing to Rudd’s (2014) 26th ranked question on 152 
sea level rise and vulnerable coasts. Below-ground seagrass biomass is particularly important for 153 
sediment accretion as well as stabilization against storm erosion (Bos et al. 2007; Christiansen et al. 154 
2013). By helping to immobilise sediment, seagrass meadows also reduce re-suspension and 155 
increase water transparency (Duarte 2002; Ondiviela et al. 2013). In the Arabian Gulf, for example, 156 
sediment stabilization and shoreline protection represent important ecosystem service functions of 157 
seagrass meadows (Erftemeijer and Shuail 2012). Overall, the effectiveness and efficiency of the 158 
coastal protection services provided by seagrass ecosystems varies across spatial and temporal 159 
scales due to differences in species type (i.e. vegetative characteristics), coastal distribution, flow-160 
vegetation interactions and water dynamic properties (Ondiviela et al. 2013). In monetary terms, the 161 
erosion control services provided by seagrass beds (inclusive of algal beds) have been estimated at 162 
US$25,000 ha
-1
yr
-1
 (Costanza et al. 2014).  163 
2.3 Provisioning services: biodiversity and fish nurseries 164 
The physical and biological structure of seagrass meadows is central to their significance as 165 
a marine biotope (Gullström et al. 2008; Saenger et al. 2013). The high primary productivity of 166 
seagrass, their epiphytes and associated benthic algae provide an important energy source to support 167 
local, transient and distant food webs (Heck et al., 2008). In addition, the structural complexity of 168 
seagrass meadows offers sites for attachment and a place to avoid predation (Farina et al. 2009). 169 
These attributes mean seagrass meadows  function as  foraging areas, refuges and nursery habitats 170 
for diverse communities of marine life, many of which are commercially important or endangered 171 
(Bujang et al. 2006; Orth et al. 2006; Unsworth and Cullen 2010; Erftemeijer and Shuail 2012; 172 
Jaxion-Harm et al. 2012; Browne et al. 2013; Cullen-Unsworth and Unsworth 2013). Organic 173 
matter produced in seagrass meadows is also exported to adjacent ecosystems and supports a large 174 
range of marine and terrestrial consumers (Heck et al., 2008). Connectivity between mangrove and 175 
seagrass ecosystems has also been shown to be important for supporting inshore fisheries, the 176 
abundance and assemblage of fish and crustacean communities and fish life-cycle stages (Bosire et 177 
al. 2012; Saenger et al. 2013). Seagrass ecosystems are thus important for ocean priority research 178 
questions on biodiversity contributions to ecosystem function (ranked 6
th
) and biological 179 
connectivity (ranked 28
th
) (Rudd 2014).   180 
2.4 Supporting services: nutrient cycling 181 
Seagrass meadows are directly involved in nutrient cycling through their uptake of water 182 
column nutrients, storage in biomass, detritus and sediment, and indirectly through the effect of 183 
seagrass metabolism on water column and sediment nutrient re-cycling (Saenger et al. 2013). The 184 
nutrient cycling capacity of seagrass meadows has been estimated to contribute about US$26,000 185 
ha
-1
yr
-1
, or US$1.9 trillion in aggregate, to the global economy (Waycott et al. 2009; Costanza et al. 186 
2014).   187 
2.5 Cultural services: social relations 188 
Wetland ecosystems play vital cultural, economic and ecological roles, supporting 189 
livelihoods and reducing poverty (Verma and Negandhi 2011; Kumar et al. 2011; Senaratna 190 
Sellamuttu et al. 2011). Frequently, the fish and marine invertebrate populations supported by intact 191 
seagrass ecosystems maintain stocks of commercial and artisanal importance, and their exploitation 192 
makes significant economic and food security contributions to many coastal communities (Jackson 193 
et al., 2001). In some cases seagrass supported fisheries may provide a harvest value of up to 194 
US$3500 ha
-1
 yr
-1
 (Waycott et al. 2009). In Tarut Bay, (Arabian Gulf), seagrass ecosystems support 195 
a US$22 million yr
-1
 fishery (Erftemeijer and Shuail 2012). Prawns are also the basis for extensive 196 
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fisheries, particularly along warm-temperate and tropical coastlines, and previous estimates of the 197 
potential total annual yield from seagrass ecosystems in Northern Queensland, (Australia), equated 198 
to a landed value of between AUS$0.6 million to AUS$2.2 million yr
-1
 (Watson et al., 1993). In the 199 
Caribbean and Indo-Pacific region valuable species such as queen conch (Euatrombus gigas), spiny 200 
lobster (Palinuridae), and smudgespot spinefoot (Siganus canaliculatus) also support local fisheries 201 
(Cullen-Unsworth and Unsworth 2013; Baker et al. 2014).  202 
Shellfish gleaning frequently supports artisanal fishers’ subsistence and generates income 203 
for rural households (Unsworth and Cullen 2010). Invertebrate harvesters in Zanzibar, East Africa, 204 
can earn between US$8.51 to US$17.01 per catch from gleaning activities, emphasizing the social-205 
ecological connections between coastal community livelihoods and seagrass ecosystem functioning 206 
(Nordlund et al. 2010). In some locations, the scale of inshore fisheries supported by seagrass 207 
ecosystems have been shown to be more significant (in economic terms) than those supported by 208 
mangroves or coral reefs. Recent evidence from Chwaka Bay (Zanzibar) indicated that fishers 209 
spend 70% of their time fishing seagrass meadows and preferred fishing there compared to 210 
mangrove and coral reef habitats (de la Torre-Castro et al. 2014). As a consequence, over 50% of 211 
the fish sold in the central market derived from seagrass meadows. In Wakatobi National Park 212 
(Indonesia), 60% of invertebrate collectors and 40% of fishers and gleaners preferred harvesting 213 
from seagrass meadows compared to 20% of collectors, fishers and gleaners who preferred to 214 
harvest exclusively from coral reefs (Unsworth et al. 2010).  215 
3 The value of ecosystem services provided by seagrass ecosystems 216 
3.1 Ecosystem service valuation 217 
Valuing ecosystem services has become an increasingly important tool for demonstrating 218 
the significance of biodiversity and ES to society and informing policy decisions (Gomez-219 
Baggethun et al. 2010; Brondizo et al. 2010; Dendoncker et al. 2014; Liekens and De Nocker 2014). 220 
ES valuations have been criticized for focusing disproportionately on utilitarian values, overly 221 
commodifying nature and ignoring ecological complexity, potentially leading to erroneous policy 222 
decisions (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Norgarrd, 2010; Gowdy and Baveve, 2014). In light of these 223 
criticisms efforts to value ES have increasingly sought to focus on integrating the ecological, social 224 
and economic dimensions of ES into a unified whole (Figure S1 Supplementary Material) (TEEB, 225 
2010; UK NEA 2011; Dendoncker et al. 2014). A plethora of monetary and non-monetary 226 
techniques have recently been developed to try and capture the broadest range of ‘values’ across the 227 
breadth of ecosystem services (Table S1 Supplementary Material). Seagrass ecosystems provide a 228 
potentially tractable environment within which to conduct multi-faceted valuation research and 229 
address an important ocean research question (ranked 53
rd
, Rudd, 2014) on ecosystem service 230 
valuation implications.   231 
3.2 Seagrass and wetland valuation studies 232 
Economic valuations of seagrass ecosystems remain few in number, with most focusing on 233 
the market value of commercial fisheries as the primary ecosystem service of importance (Table 2). 234 
 235 
Table 2 Valuation studies of seagrass meadows  
Study Location Description Value 
Watson et al. 
(1993) 
Queensland 
(Australia) 
Multi-species prawn fishery 
 
 
A$1.2 million yr
-1
 
McArthur & 
Boland (2006) 
South Australia 
(Australia) 
Secondary fisheries production 
 
 
A$114 million yr
-1
 
Unsworth et 
al. (2010) 
Wakatobi National 
Park (Indonesia) 
Ecological and socio-economic assessments of the 
importance of seagrass meadow fisheries 
 
US$230 million 
(value extrapolated 
to the national 
level) 
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Kamimura et 
al. (2011) 
Seto Inland Sea 
(Japan) 
Wild juvenile black rockfish (Sebastes cheni) production 
 
US$78600 yr
-1
 
Rudd & 
Weigand 
(2011) 
Newfoundland, 
Canada 
Choice experiment to estimate citizens’ willingness to pay 
(WTP) for improvements in three ecosystem services 
associated with a reduction in wastewater pollution in the 
Humber Arm, with eelgrass (Zostera marin) used as an 
indicator for estuarine biological diversity 
 
$2.63 sq km
-1
 
household
-1
 yr
-1 
Lavery et al. 
(2013) 
Australia Estimation of the value of stored organic carbon beneath 
Australia’s seagrass ecosystems (17 habitats, 10 seagrass 
species). Valuation based on the Corg content of the top 
25cm of sediment 
 
A$3.9-5.4 billion 
Vassallo et al. 
(2013) 
Isle of Bergeggi 
(Italy) 
Natural capital assessment of Posidonia oceanica 
seagrass meadows using emergy analysis. Focused on the 
collective value of four ecosystem services: nursery 
function, sedimentation and hydrodynamics, primary 
production and oxygen release 
 
€172 m-2 a-1 
Tuya et al. 
(2014) 
Gran Canaria 
Island (Spain) 
Primary and secondary fisheries associated with 
Cymodocea nodosa seagrass meadows 
 
€673269 yr-1 
(whole island 
value) 
Blandon and 
zu Ermgassen 
(2014) 
South Australia 
(Australia) 
Meta-analysis of juvenile fish abundance to assess the 
juvenile fish enhancement capacity of seagrass 
ecosystems. Thirteen commercial fish established to be 
recruitment enhanced 
Species were 
enhanced by 
approx. A$230000 
ha
-1
 yr
-1 
 236 
In several respects seagrass ecosystems have been marginalized in favour of other coastal 237 
and estuarine ecosystems, meaning valuation studies conducted for other wetland biotopes (i.e. 238 
mangroves, coral reefs and saltmarshes) are the only suitable avenue to identify comparative 239 
estimates for commonly shared ecosystem services that may offer insights into the expected range 240 
of values for seagrass meadows (Table 3).  241 
 242 
Table 3 Valuation studies of coastal and wetland ecosystem services 243 
Study
a 
Description Ecosystem Service Values 
Barbier et 
al. (2011) 
Global synthesis of estuarine and 
coastal ecosystem services 
Coastal protection: (US$174 ha
-1
 yr
-1
 coral reefs in the Indian 
Ocean, US$236 ha
-1
 yr
-1
 saltmarshes in the US and US$966-
1082 ha
-1
 yr
-1
 mangroves in Thailand). Maintenance of fisheries: 
(US$5-45000 Km-
2
 yr
-1
 coral reefs (local consumption and 
exports) in the Philippines, US$647-981 acre
-1
 saltmarshes 
(recreational fishing) in Florida and US$708-987 ha
-1
 
mangroves in Thailand).Carbon sequestration: (US$30.50 ha
-1
 
yr
-1
 for saltmarshes and mangroves based on global 
sequestration rates). Tourism, Recreation and Research: 
(US$88,000 coral reefs in the Seychelles, £31.60 person
-1
 
saltmarsh (otter habitat creation) in the UK) 
 
UNEP 
(2011) 
Total economic value of the 
ecosystem services delivered by 
mangroves in Gazi Bay, Kenya 
Total Economic Valuation: (US$1092 ha
-1
 yr
-1
)  
e.g., Fishery: (US$44 ha
-1
 yr
-1
) Coastal protection: (US$91.7 ha
-
1
 yr
-1
) Carbon sequestration: (US$126 ha
-1
 yr
-1
) Biodiversity: 
(US$5 ha-1 yr-1) Existence value: (US$594.4 ha
-1
 yr
-1
) 
 
Verma and 
Negandhi 
(2011) 
Livelihood dependency and 
economic evaluation of the Bhopal 
wetland, India 
Fisheries production: (US$33 month
-1
 fisherman
-1
) Boating 
activities (US$2264 yr
-1
 boatman
-1
) waterchestnut cultivation 
(US$222 yr
-1
 family
-1
) cloth washing activities (US$66 month
-1
 
household
-1
) secondary activities e.g., sugar cane juice sellers 
(US$6000 yr
-1
) 
 
Brander et 
al. (2012) 
Meta-analysis of the value of ES 
supplied by mangroves mainly in 
Overall mean and (median) value: US$4185(239) ha
-1
 yr
-1
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Southeast Asia. Valuations based 
predominantly on fisheries, fuel 
wood, coastal protection and water 
quality 
 
Salem and 
Mercer 
(2012) 
Global estimates of mangrove 
ecosystem services 
Fisheries: (US$23,613 ha
-1
 yr
-1
). Forestry: (US$38,115 ha
-1
 yr
-
1
). Recreation and Tourism: (US$37,927 ha
-1
 yr
-1
). Non-Use: 
(US$17,373 ha
-1
 yr
-1
). Water purification: (US$4,784 ha
-1
 yr
-1
) 
 
Brander et 
al. (2013) 
Global meta-analysis of ES delivered 
by wetland systems in agricultural 
landscapes, with a focus on three 
regulating services: flood control, 
water supply and nutrient cycling 
Mean and (median) values presented 
 
Flood control: US$6923(427) ha
-1
 yr
-1
 Water supply: 
US$3398(57) ha
-1
 yr
-1
 Nutrient cycling: US$5788(243) ha
-1
 yr
-1
   
 
 
 
Camacho-
Valdez et al. 
(2013) 
Socio-economic benefit of 
saltmarshes in Northwest Mexico 
US$1 billion yr
-1 
 
 
 
James et al. 
(2013) 
The social (non-monetary) values 
attached to mangroves across three 
villages in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria. Social values assessed were: 
therapeutic, amenity, heritage, 
spiritual and existence 
Mean values for the village-level importance placed on these 
aspects of the social value of mangroves 
 
Therapeutic: (14%-71%) Amenity: (65%-73%) Heritage: (70%-
92%) Spiritual: (44%-76%) Existence: (89%-91%) 
 
 
Kakuru et 
al. (2013) 
Wetland ecosystem services in 
Uganda 
Flood control: (US$1.7 billion yr
-1
). Water regulation: (US$7 
million yr
-1
) 
 244 
 245 
 246 
Overall, the lack of in-depth local studies spanning different continents and regions valuing 247 
the breadth of ecosystem services provided by seagrass ecosystems needs to be remedied, with 248 
particular focus on qualitative value attributions associated with the social-ecological dynamics of 249 
seagrass systems (Cullen-Unsworth and Unsworth 2013). This view supported the wider sentiment 250 
articulated by Raheem et al. (2012:1169), that “there is a dearth of spatially explicit non-market 251 
values for services provided by coastal and other ecosystems”, and by the Abu Dhabi Global 252 
Environmental Data Initiative (AGEDI 2014:10), that the “option of combining Blue Carbon with 253 
other ecosystem services valuation should be kept open to provide multiple potential values that can 254 
support conservation activities”. Strengthening the evidence base regarding the global economic 255 
value of oceans (ranked 48
th
, Rudd 2014) requires site-specific seagrass ecosystem valuation efforts 256 
that can be used to derive transfer values from meta-analyses (e.g., Brander et al. 2012; Johnston et 257 
al. 2005).   258 
4 Policy frameworks for Blue Carbon management  259 
Recent thinking about Blue Carbon acknowledges the special importance of the carbon 260 
storage and sequestration capability of coastal and marine wetlands and organisms in global climate 261 
change scenarios and policies (Sifleet et al. 2011; Vaidyanathan 2011). Blue Carbon sinks capture 262 
and store amounts of carbon equivalent to up to half of global transport emissions ( ~ 400 Tg C yr
-1
) 263 
yet their inclusion in current mitigation and adaptation programs has been very limited (UNEP 264 
2009; Tommaso et al., 2014). Developments could occur in the regulated (compliance) or the 265 
unregulated (voluntary) carbon sectors. We take each in turn. 266 
4.1 The regulated sector 267 
4.1.1 Policies and processes 268 
a 
The examples we cite are not meant to be exhaustive but rather illustrative of the different types of services and values 
attributed to a range of coastal wetland ecosystems, and are therefore to be seen as a guide for the range of possible 
valuations that may be attributed to seagrass ecosystems. 
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Collectively, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 269 
1992, Article 4 (d)), Manado Ocean Declaration (2009), Cancún Agreement (2010) and Rio Ocean 270 
Declaration (2012) provide opportunities for development of Blue Carbon initiatives. In practice, 271 
however, current policy processes inadequately account for the restoration and protection of Blue 272 
Carbon systems (Grimsditch 2011; Murray et al. 2011). This is due, in part, to the initial bias 273 
towards terrestrial climate change mitigation and adaptation activities within the UNFCCC, 274 
alongside the acknowledgment that practical expansion to coastal and marine systems (from 275 
principled intentions) would require further international agreement (Murray et al. 2012). However, 276 
as a recent report indicates (UNEP and CIFOR 2014: x) ‘climate change mitigation frameworks 277 
developed for terrestrial ecosystems can be extended to include coastal wetlands’.  278 
There are clear points of entry for Blue Carbon funded activities under the parallel pathways 279 
of the UNFCCC, specifically: the Land Use and Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) and the 280 
clean development mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol; and the Reduced Emissions from 281 
Deforestation and forest Degradation + (REDD+) and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 282 
(NAMAs) of the Durban Platform. In many cases these entry points require altering or 283 
reinterpreting definitions (Gordon et al. 2011; Grimsditch 2011; Murray et al. 2011; 2012). 284 
Nevertheless, some argue that by the Paris COP 21 meeting in 2015 negotiations are likely to have 285 
reached a consensus for including an approach for Blue Carbon accounting under the UNFCCC 286 
(UNEP and CIFOR 2014).   287 
4.1.2 Kyoto protocol opportunities 288 
Limited possibilities exist within the Kyoto Protocol (Murray et al. 2012). However, some 289 
progress has been made through the recently updated Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change 290 
(IPCC) guidelines. The so-called ‘Wetlands Supplement’ includes guidance for national 291 
governments to report carbon emissions and removals for specific management activities in coastal 292 
wetlands (e.g., mangroves, tidal marshes and seagrass meadows) (IPCC 2014). The activities that 293 
national governments will be able include in their national inventories for greenhouse gases covers 294 
forest management in mangroves, certain aspects of aquaculture, drainage and restoration or 295 
creation of coastal wetlands. However, this supplementary regulation is ‘encouraged but not 296 
mandatory in context of any other activities under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Kyoto 297 
Protocol’ (UNFCCC 2014).  298 
Moreover, extension of current LULUCF definitions to cover wetland ecosystems is lacking 299 
(Murray et al. 2012). However, with the publication of the IPCC Wetland Supplement the case for 300 
not including a broader set of definitions that specifically mention wetlands is harder to justify. 301 
Furthermore, activities under LULUCF could include avoided wetland degradation via alternative 302 
use or prohibiting disturbance (Herr et al. 2012). With regards to baseline credit mechanisms such 303 
as the CDM, in 2011 a mangrove project was approved as an afforestation and reforestation 304 
activity. However, the methodology applied is specifically for mangroves and not (so far at least) 305 
transferable to tidal marshes or seagrass meadows (Lovelock & McAllister 2013). Moreover, the 306 
much more substantial avoided emissions resulting from protecting Blue Carbon pools remain 307 
outside this mechanism (Murray et al. 2011; 2012). 308 
4.1.3 Durban platform opportunities 309 
The Durban Platform provides more scope for Blue Carbon activities. Mangroves are now 310 
covered by REDD+ (Grimsditch 2011). However, seagrass inclusion remains some way off: this 311 
would require a broader definition of ‘forests’ as well as an extension of emission and reduction 312 
activities across all land-uses (i.e., Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses, AFOLU) (Murray et 313 
al. 2011; 2012; Siikamaki et al. 2013). Nevertheless, AFOLU projects do include a variety of 314 
carbon accounting protocols relating to biomass, Corg and greenhouse gas emissions (UNEP and 315 
CIFOR 2014). There have been calls to decouple carbon sequestration and emissions arising from 316 
habitat degradation (Grimsditch 2011). This is particularly important for seagrass meadows where 317 
the ‘real’ carbon of interest is buried in the sediment. Under REDD+, deciding what aspects of the 318 
Blue Carbon pool (i.e. sediment/soil-carbon or above-ground biomass) count would be especially 319 
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important (Murray et al. 2011). Extension of REDD+ to seagrass meadows could easily see them 320 
contributing to reduced emissions via the degradation pathway, through a focus on management 321 
strategies linked to tackling the negative impacts of nutrient loading for example (Seifert-Granzin 322 
2010). Developments to include tidal wetland restoration and conservation under REDD+ are 323 
currently on-going (UNEP and CIFOR 2014). 324 
NAMAs offer the most direct route for funding Blue Carbon enterprises because countries 325 
have autonomy over the activities that form part of their national strategies, and could reasonably 326 
protect and restore wetland and coastal ecosystems (Grimsditch 2011; Herr et al. 2012; Murray et 327 
al. 2012). Furthermore, the green climate fund provides finances for programs in accordance with 328 
NAMAs that could be directed towards Blue Carbon activities (Herr et al. 2012). However, the 329 
challenge remains that inclusion of these activities under a national framework would still require 330 
measurement, reporting and verification approval (Murray et al. 2012). 331 
4.2 The voluntary sector  332 
4.2.1 The global voluntary carbon market 333 
The voluntary carbon market (VCM) accounts for 0.1% and 0.02% of the value and volume 334 
of the regulated global carbon market respectively (Benessaiah 2012). Yet rapid sector expansion 335 
has led to increasing interest from governments, particularly in relation to carbon standards and 336 
registries (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013). The principal attraction of the VCM is its deregulated 337 
nature, which helps to reduce transaction costs and stimulate innovation. However, the trade-off to 338 
this regulatory flexibility is market uncertainty and depression of the carbon price, which can have 339 
serious implications for expected project returns (Benessaiah 2012; Thompson et al. 2014).  Project 340 
size is also a determinant of offset price, with smaller projects garnering higher carbon prices for 341 
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). The average carbon price for micro projects (i.e., those 342 
generating less than 5 Kt CO2e yr
-1
) was recently US$10/tCO2e, whereas the mean carbon price for 343 
mega projects (i.e. those generating more than 1 Mt CO2e yr
-1
) was US$5.8/tCO2e (Peters-Stanley 344 
and Yin 2013).  345 
Worldwide carbon standards have expanded from concentrating purely on carbon 346 
accounting to emphasising co-benefits (Peters-Stanley and Hamilton, 2012). This has been driven, 347 
particularly in the private sector, by an increasing interest in measuring and verifying non-carbon 348 
project outcomes (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013). Programs are progressively focusing on climate 349 
change adaptation, public health, gender issues and biodiversity as additional attributes to non-350 
carbon benefits (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013) (Table 4). For example, the verified carbon standard 351 
(VCS), which accounts for 55% of market share, considers climate, community and biodiversity 352 
(16%) and Social Carbon (2%) co-benefits (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013).  This is important for 353 
ecosystems such as seagrass meadows that provide multiple benefits in addition to carbon storage as 354 
those benefits might be captured via broader standard attributes.  355 
 356 
Table 4 Carbon standards appropriate for joint environmental and development projects 357 
Carbon Standard and Credits Description 
Gold Standard (acquired Carbon Fix Standard) Carbon accounting + embedded co-benefits 
Plan Vivo Carbon accounting + embedded co-benefits 
VCS 
VCS and CCB 
Carbon accounting + tagged co-benefits 
 
This joint process is premised on the notion that forestry and land-
use projects with be better able to meet emission reduction targets 
and achieve co-benefits if validation/verification costs are lowered 
 
Social Carbon Co-benefits (needs to be accompanied by a carbon accounting 
standard) 
 
Global Conservation Standard Developed for the purposes of ensuring conservation can deliver 
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 payments to local landholders, the accounting system is based on 
the ‘stock’ amount of identifiable and measurable ecosystem 
service benefits – credited through the use of Conservation Credit 
Units (CCUs). The first protocol established CCUs based on 
carbon stocks in vegetation. 
Women’s Carbon Standard Certifying the role, engagement and leadership of women in carbon 
projects. Jointly administered by Women Organising for Change in 
Agriculture and Natural Resource Management – WOCAN 
 
Vulnerability Reduction Credits Acknowledges and qualifies reduction in community vulnerability 
arising from adaptation efforts. Administered by the Higher 
Ground Foundation 
 
The Poverty Alleviation Criteria Tool Measures the poverty alleviation outcomes resulting from forestry 
and other land-use projects implemented under the Panda Standard. 
Developed jointly by ACR (American Carbon Registry) and the 
China Beijing Environmental Exchange 
 358 
Another important development for coastal wetland systems such as seagrass meadows is 359 
that the VCM has highlighted the special connections between carbon and water. Both VCS and the 360 
American Carbon Registry (ACR) have coastal wetland accredited carbon accounting 361 
methodologies (Peters-Stanley and Hamilton 2012; Thomas 2014).  For example, in the Mississippi 362 
Delta the ACR has developed a wetland restoration protocol (UNEP and CIFOR 2014). 363 
Furthermore, VCS has also developed a soil carbon sampling methodology that could be transferred 364 
to wetland and peatland ecosystems (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013). Indeed, VCS methodologies 365 
cover the full array of Blue Carbon activities, from restoration and re-vegetation to conservation 366 
and management, and in late 2013, the ‘Greenhouse Gas Accounting Methods for Tidal Wetlands 367 
and Seagrass Restoration’ methodology was submitted to VCS and is currently awaiting approval 368 
(UNEP and CIFOR 2014). 369 
Although the increasing alignment between livelihood development and carbon 370 
management is welcomed, several challenges exist. Specifically, a lack of appropriate markets, 371 
negotiating trade-offs between maximizing economic efficiency and ensuring equity in benefit 372 
flows, and adequately socially embedding payment schemes. These challenges relate to broader 373 
issues of the transaction costs of ocean management (ranked 57
th
, Rudd 2014). Developing 374 
inclusive sustainable livelihood VCM projects depends on the provision of secure property rights 375 
and tenure arrangements regarding the ownership and use of resources. However, providing secure 376 
property rights alongside certification can be prohibitively expensive (e.g., CCB certification is 377 
estimated at US$4000 – US$8000) even though adequately accounting for costs and securing 378 
financial streams is essential (Benessaiah 2012). Negotiating investment risk and return uncertainty 379 
are significant challenges in community-based carbon projects where non-compliance and complex 380 
program arrangements are pressing issues. Likewise, the provision of ‘enabling institutions’ for 381 
effective administrative, operational and implementation performance remains crucial. 382 
Nevertheless, the advantages of the voluntary carbon market outweigh the downsides and present a 383 
more immediately attractive option even if in some quarters the regulated carbon market is the 384 
preferred long-term option (Benessaiah 2012; Ullman et al. 2012). 385 
4.2.2 Multilateral environmental agreements 386 
The sustainability of estuarine, coastal and marine habitats, with regards to their use, 387 
conservation, restoration and in climate change mitigation and adaptation have been alluded to 388 
under several regional and international multilateral agreements for example: the Convention on 389 
Biological Diversity (CBD); Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar); UNEP Global Programme 390 
of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Landbased Activities (GPA-Marine); 391 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Areas of the South-East 392 
Pacific (Lima Convention) and the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). 393 
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Although predominantly management and advocacy-related, some of these programs offer financial 394 
support for Blue Carbon activities (Laffoley 2013). 395 
4.2.3 National level policies 396 
 Research evaluating the ways in which vegetative coastal ecosystem services and carbon in 397 
particular can be included in national level statues and policies is lacking, partly as a result of the 398 
highly individual nature of national legislation. However, Pendleton et al. (2013) have identified 399 
how such ‘coastal carbon’ could be incorporated under a subset of existing U.S. federal statutes and 400 
policies including the National Environmental Policy Act, the Comprehensive Environment 401 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act, the Oil Pollution Act, the Clean Water Act and the 402 
Coastal Zone Management Act amongst several others. The analysis indicates that although coastal 403 
carbon services are not currently accounted for under existing federal-level legislation, to do so 404 
would be relatively straightforward and consistent with the implementation of these regulations 405 
(Pendleton et al. 2013). Nevertheless, despite this relative ease, incorporating coastal carbon into 406 
existing federal legislation would require further improvements in the availability of expertise, 407 
guidance and procedures for assessing the value of coastal carbon, quantifying the impacts of 408 
projects on carbon storage and sequestration and mapping the spatial dynamics of coastal 409 
ecosystems. The lack of precedent (i.e., the formal assessment and analysis of the benefit-costs of 410 
coastal carbon economics values in these regulations) was also recognised as an important 411 
limitation that would need to be overcome for wider ‘coastal carbon functions’ to be frequently 412 
included in regulatory assessments (Pendleton et al. 2013). Importantly, these considerations are 413 
equally applicable to State-level legislation as they are to other national legislative policies and 414 
statutes in other countries. 415 
4.2.4 Blue Carbon demonstration sites and the future 416 
Recent research, policy and financing advancements in Blue Carbon relevant to seagrass 417 
meadows include global programs. The Blue Carbon Initiative (www.thebluecarboninitiative.org) 418 
focused on integrating Blue Carbon activities into the UNFCCC and other carbon financing 419 
mechanisms (Herr et al. 2012; Thomas 2014). Charities such as The Ocean Foundation and partners 420 
(www.seagrassgrow.org) have developed a Blue Carbon calculator that determines CO2 emission 421 
reduction offsets in terms of the protection and restoration of seagrass meadows (a method pending 422 
formal approval by the VCS). Collectively, developments such as the Blue Carbon portal 423 
(www.bluecarbonportal.org) and work by Bredbenner (2013) and Thomas (2014) have 424 
demonstrated the current global extent of Blue Carbon activities. In particular, significant work 425 
remains to establish a functioning global network of fully implemented Blue Carbon programmes 426 
involving the active transfer of carbon credits (Locatelli et al. 2014). In this regard, securing private 427 
financing of Blue Carbon activities will become increasingly important (Thomas, 2014). Presently, 428 
Blue Carbon programs are predominantly research-oriented, in the early stages of development and 429 
mangrove-focused, with few directed efforts towards seagrass ecosystems (Table 5) (Bredbenner 430 
2013).  431 
 432 
Table 5 Seagrass-related Blue Carbon initiatives 433 
Blue Carbon Project Description 
Long-term ecological research in the Patos 
Lagoon Estuary (Brazil) – Institute of 
Oceanography and Federal University of 
Rio Grande 
 
Spatial and temporal description of seagrass and macroalgae vegetation 
changes. Mapping, biomass and sedimentation sampling for carbon stock 
evaluation 
National seagrass ecosystem mapping 
(Brazil) - Universidade Estadual de Rio de 
Janeiro, Universidade Federal do Rio 
Grande, 
Universidade Federal de Santa Catariana e 
Universidade Federal Rural de Pernambuco 
Spatial mapping of Brazil’s seagrass ecosystems, distribution and extent, 
and the determination of the associated carbon stock  
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Seagrass and Mangrove pilot assessments 
(Indonesia) - Agency for Research and 
Development of Marine and Fisheries, 
Ministry of Marine 
Affairs, Fisheries-Indonesia 
 
Three pilot areas: Banten, East Kalimantan and North Sulawesi – field 
surveys, mapping and biophysical sampling of seagrass and mangrove 
systems to assess carbon storage and sequestration, alongside the socio-
economic value of these systems for improving policy 
 
Mangrove, saltmarsh and seagrass Blue 
Carbon potential (China) - Tsinghua 
University, Xiamen University, State 
Oceanic Administration 
Assessment of the Blue Carbon potential of these ecosystems (i.e. carbon 
storage and sequestration) to provide evidence to support habitat 
restoration linked to carbon credit scheme 
 434 
 435 
5 Seagrass habitats: prospects for PES  436 
Here we explore opportunities for developing seagrass PES programmes. The options we 437 
describe should be seen as working in tandem with carbon-credit schemes not as mutually exclusive 438 
alternatives. 439 
5.1 A brief explanation of PES 440 
PES programs are marketed as win-win opportunities, supporting conservation and the 441 
sustainable use of natural resources while improving rural livelihoods (van Noordwijk et al. 2007; 442 
Muradian and Rival 2012; Pokorny et al. 2012).Yet, what constitutes PES, both in theory and 443 
practice, and PES success is open to debate (e.g., Wunder 2005; Farley and Costanza 2010; 444 
Muradian et al. 2010; Hejnowicz et al. 2014). This is largely due to the plurality of financial 445 
arrangements underpinning PES schemes, which include government-financed, user-financed or 446 
hybrid co-financed arrangements, often involving external donors, such that the ways in which they 447 
function do not conform to a single operational standard (Schomers & Matzdorf, 2013). Financially 448 
speaking, however, they can (generally) be thought of as a form of direct payment based on the 449 
beneficiary pays principle (Parker and Cranford, 2010). Within typical PES programs (Lin and 450 
Nakamura 2012; Tacconi 2012; Derissen and Latacz-Lohmann 2013, Martin-Ortega et al. 2013), 451 
ES providers (e.g., landholders, farmers or communities) voluntarily participate in a program 452 
whereby they receive payments from ES buyers (e.g., a government, a utility or private 453 
organisation). Transactions are facilitated by a single or multiple set of intermediary actors (e.g., a 454 
semi-autonomous body or non-governmental organisation). In return for payments, providers adopt 455 
alternative land-use practices and management strategies that can secure and deliver a set of 456 
important ES to a wider beneficiary population.  457 
Institutionally, PES programs are generally framed as decentralized instruments favouring 458 
bottom-up solutions to land management issues (Landen-Mills and Porras 2002; Bond and Mayers, 459 
2010). Despite the diversity of contexts in which PES schemes operate, they tend to adopt common 460 
modes of activity such as restricting agricultural development, proposing alternative cropping 461 
arrangements, reducing deforestation and expanding forests (e.g., reforestation and afforestation), or 462 
protecting watershed and hydrological services (e.g., Aquith et al. 2008; Bennett 2008; Muňoz-Pina 463 
et al. 2008; Porras 2010; World Bank 2010; Wunder and Alban 2008). Consequently, PES involves 464 
multiple partners across sectors as well as spanning spatial and temporal scales (Schomers and 465 
Matzdorf 2013). To function properly, schemes need to be acceptable to stakeholders, take the form 466 
of contractual obligations to which all participating parties agree, have specified objectives, be 467 
operationally transparent, and provide payments (in monetary or in-kind terms) to ES providers that 468 
account for (ideally) the full range of their opportunity costs (Wunder et al. 2008; Hejnowicz et al. 469 
2014).  470 
5.2 PES case studies and some considerations 471 
Examples relevant to guiding the development of seagrass payment schemes need to involve 472 
community approaches to natural resource management, as well as the provision of multiple ES 473 
with a focus on carbon management (e.g., Table S2 Supplementary Material). Schemes seeking to 474 
Adapted from Bredbenner (2013) 
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deliver multiple ES via incentive mechanisms must also tackle the issue of stacking and bundling 475 
(Box 1). That is to say, determining what ES are to be provided, whether they will be paid for 476 
individually (i.e., stacked) or collectively (i.e., bundled), and what form payments will take (Bianco 477 
2009). Additionally, PES programs need to ensure that as part of their design and implementation 478 
they maximize biodiversity and social co-benefits by adopting a decoupled approach to benefit 479 
maximization (recognizing individual ES properties and spatial attributes), ensuring management 480 
decisions account for internal and external costs, and increasing social co-benefit provision by 481 
concentrating on economic and cultural context (Greiner and Stanley 2013; Phelps et al. 2013; Potts 482 
et al. 2013).  483 
Box 1 Stacking and bundling ecosystem services 484 
 485 
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5.3 Seagrass PES scheme options 518 
5.3.1 Regulating fisheries and developing protected areas 519 
Many possible institutions are available to control and direct fishing activities along coasts 520 
and marine ecosystems (Rudd 2004). They may involve fishing gear and net restrictions, limiting 521 
Stacking refers to the receipt of multiple payments for different ES provided from a single plot or parcel (Bianco, 
2009; Cooley and Olander 2012). Cooley and Olander (2012) recognise three forms of stacking, namely: horizontal 
(whereby individual management practices performed on spatially distinct areas each receive a payment); vertical 
(where a single management practice employed on spatially overlapping areas receives multiple payments) and 
temporal (essentially a vertical form of stacking where payments are disbursed over time according to the production 
of different ES). 
Advantages of stacking: (i) delivers management that provides multiple services from programs concerned with 
specific services; (ii) potentially increases programme uptake rates and therefore ES provision, (iii) encourages large-
scale projects that could not operate through single payments e.g., wetland restoration, (iv) may increase buyer 
diversification, and (v) incrementally stacking payments in an optimum way for a particular project can help raise 
necessary funds (Bianco 2009; Cooley and Olander 2012; Robert and Sterger 2013). 
Disadvantages of stacking: (i) stacking can make it difficult to demonstrate how ES delivered by  mitigation projects 
have abated environmental impacts allowed through offset sales; (ii) stacking may undermine project ‘additionality’ 
e.g., if payments are more than that required to initiate a project, or are for an activity that would have occurred in the 
absence of the project, and (iii) stacking indirectly encourages ‘double counting’ – paying twice for (in essence) the 
same service  where similar services overlap e.g., water quality credits and wetland mitigation credits (Bianco 2009; 
Cooley and Olander 2012). 
In the case of bundling, single payments are received for the provision of multiple ES from an individual parcel – 
importantly payment amounts are not (generally speaking) based on the summation of the individual values of each 
ES (Cooley and Olander 2012). 
Advantages of bundling: (i) recognises the interconnectedness of ES processes and production; (ii) is beneficial for 
biodiversity and conservation (where broad conservation outcomes are sought); (iii) may increase the overall 
provision of individual ES from a parcel; (iv) can reduce administrative and transaction costs and raise price 
premiums, and (v) may reduce the degree of infrastructure needed to support a functioning market (Greenhalgh 2008; 
Wendland et al. 2010; Deal et al. 2012; Robert and Sterger 2013). 
Disadvantages of bundling: (i) optimising multiple ES is difficult and given the uncertainty regarding quantification 
may lead to unintended trade-offs; (ii) limited knowledge concerning ES provision means accurately modelling ES 
spatial delivery and distribution is highly complex; (iii) regulatory requirements may mean that it is necessary to 
‘unbundle’ specific services from the broader set; (iv) it can be difficult to demonstrate additionality and mitigate 
against double counting, and (v) performance related payments can be difficult to manage as ES bundle provision 
varies with time (Greenhalgh 2008; Wendland et al. 2010; Deal et al. 2012; Robert and Sterger 2013).  
Projects that employ either stacking or bundling need to ensure they have resolved the issues of additionality and 
double counting before proceeding (Bianco 2009). 
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fishing permits to local residents and restricting the exploitation of connected habitats while 522 
providing alternative income generating projects and ‘legal’ fishing equipment (e.g., Mnazi Bay 523 
Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park, Tanzania – Alberts et al. 2012; Mohammed 2012). Enforcing closed 524 
fishing seasons while providing wage supplements to fishers to offset opportunity costs resulting 525 
from deferred fishing activities is another approach (e.g., the defeso system in Brazil – Bergossi et 526 
al. 2011, Bergossi et al. 2012). Seagrass PES schemes may often involve creating marine protected 527 
areas (MPAs), safeguarding the underlying resource base supporting coastal communities and 528 
compensating local fishers for lost income resulting from harvesting restrictions (Table 6).  529 
Designating ‘no-take-zones’  to increase habitat cover and fish stocks, and compensating fishers for 530 
lost income is a strategy that some external non-governmental organisation (NGO) donors have 531 
used (e.g., Kuruwitu Conservation and Welfare Association in Kenya – Mohammed 2012). Setting 532 
up seagrass PES schemes requires research in a number of areas identified as priorities (Rudd 533 
2014), including the role of MPAs on ecological resilience (ranked 30
th
) and their effect on human 534 
well-being (ranked 45
th
). Questions regarding compliance with rules (ranked 58
th
) and the capacity 535 
of communities to manage their coasts (ranked 56
th
) also demonstrate the potential value of seagrass 536 
PES development beyond the sector, as programs provide valuable opportunities to learn broad 537 
lessons about the interactions between social and ecological systems.  538 
 539 
Table 6 Examples of marine conservation agreements securing coastal conservation and livelihood 540 
development opportunities 541 
Country Project Summary 
Ecuador, Galera-San 
Francisco Marine Area – 
operating since 2008 
 Established to combat issues of overfishing, pollution, habitat destruction and coastal 
construction.  
 Local communities involved in the structuring of the conservation agreement and in 
the management of the conservation area. 
 Conservation agreement covers lobster fishing, no-take areas, fishing regulations and 
patrol zones. 
 Benefits to the community include employment in patrolling, management and user 
rights, access to markets for alternative income streams and capacity building. 
 Funded by the Nature Conservancy and Conservation International (via conservation 
stewardship programme) and Walton Foundation (via eastern tropical pacific seascape) 
– requires government investment to maintain the program in the long-term. 
 
Fiji, Bio-prospecting and 
Live Rock Harvesting – 
earliest projects since 1997 
 Example of locally managed marine areas (of which 200 currently exist involving 300 
communities covering 30% of inshore fisheries). 
 Bio-prospecting: External private organisations make agreements with local 
communities facilitated by the University of South Pacific (USP) and regulated by the 
government; with benefits directed to local resource owners (fees paid by these 
companies are channelled to a district conservation and education trust fund). 
 Live Rock Harvesting: To substitute the removal of the natural reef base with 
artificially created reef-bases for aquarium traders.  Local users are granted 
management and access rights over parts of the seabed. Walt Smith International signs 
agreements with local villages and trains individuals to artificially culture and harvest 
‘live rocks’. Villages pay US$0.25/Kg of bare rock and receive US$0.50/Kg of ‘live 
rock’. USP also purchases 5000Kg of material for each village on the stipulation that 
almost two-thirds of the proceeds are put back into the live rock harvesting process. 
 
Indonesia, Koon Island, 
Maluku Marine Conservation 
area – 2011 to 2014 (with 
option for yearly renewal) 
 Comprises a marine protected area, a no-take-zone (to protect spawning grounds) and a 
rights-based sustainable fishery (also involving a local fishery cooperative partnering 
with a local fishing company). 
 Established to protect biodiversity, maintain a sustainable fishery and enhance 
community development. 
 A community foundation has been created (TUBIRNUIATA) to implement project 
activities such as patrols which employ paid community members. 
 Funding is mainly through philanthropic sources as well as WWF-Indonesia – also 
attempting to establish a number of ecotourism initiatives. 
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Indonesia, Penemu and 
Bambu Islands, West Papua – 
Marine Conservation Area – 
from 2011 to 2036 
 Comprises a no-take-zone and sustainable fishery, for the purposes of conservation, 
ecotourism and community development. 
 Project developed with a local non-profit organisation Taman Perlindungan Laut (TPL) 
and Sea Sanctuaries Trust (SST). 
 Marine conservation agreement is a contract between TPL/SST and the Pam Island 
Communities, with the purpose of developing ecotourism businesses to provide 
alternative livelihood revenue streams and sustain the program long-term. Benefiting 
local communities through employment opportunities, technical assistance and access 
to goods and services. 
 Aims to be self-funding after ten years. 
 
Tanzania, Chumbe Island 
Coral Park, Zanzibar – 
established since 1992 
 Private marine reserve, which includes 30 hectares designated as a marine reef 
sanctuary (coral reef and seagrass beds) plus an additional 20 hectares of coral rag 
forest, for the purposes of conservation, research, eco-tourism and local education. 
 Chumbe Island Coral Park Ltd established the park through management contracts and 
a lease from the Zanzibar government, and has since become an international 
ecotourism destination and conservation area. 
 The ecotourism component fully covers management costs. Several international 
conservation and development donors have been involved with specific local 
conservation and education programmes. 
 The Park trains and employs local people as rangers, guides and hospitality personnel. 
Guides and rangers also function as educators to communicate to local fisherman the 
importance of the reef bed and maintaining a no-take-zone. Local people have 
benefitted through increased incomes, access to markets for local goods, technical 
assistance and improved fish stocks. 
 542 
 543 
5.3.2 Ecotourism  544 
MPA managers and coastal businesses may establish “green” levies or taxes for resort 545 
tourists and charge user-fees for diving access and licenses. Revenues generated by these charges 546 
can be re-invested to support continued management activities to enforce the operating rules and 547 
ensure compliance, conserve and restore seagrass beds, and create employment opportunities for 548 
local community members (Lutz, 2011). In this respect, participation of the private sector can be 549 
transformative for scheme development by acting as a powerful ally in conservation outreach, 550 
providing new sources of financial support and creating employment and income opportunities 551 
alongside appropriate public sector institutions (e.g., the Indonesian Yayasan Karang Lestari coral 552 
restoration project and Marin tourism park on the island of Gili Trawangan – Bottema and Bush 553 
2012).  554 
5.3.3 Linking farming, industry and watershed and coastal management 555 
Eutrophication and hypoxia resulting from nutrient loading and upland pollution are 556 
significant threats to the health of seagrass ecosystems (Waycott et al. 2009; Short et al. 2011; 557 
2014). Because upstream land-use activities can negatively affect seagrass ecosystems (Freeman 558 
2008; Rivera-Guzmán et al. 2013) the conditions necessary for emulating watershed payment 559 
schemes are ripe (Porras et al. 2013). This may involve cross-sector collaborative partnerships 560 
between local and international NGOs, who are often project initiators and intermediary facilitators, 561 
working together with public utilities, private firms and government organisations acting as ES 562 
buyers (Porras et al. 2008; Schomers and Matzdorf 2013). Benefits to water quality and reduced 563 
water treatment costs save public utilities and private firms significant financial outlays, which may 564 
then be channelled into project start-up costs and payments for participants. Examples include the 565 
equitable PES schemes for watershed services in Tanzania and Honduras (CARE 2009; Branca et 566 
al. 2011; Kosoy et al. 2007). Collectively, these examples highlight the integrated nature of coastal 567 
and terrestrial systems and demonstrate that PES schemes which acknowledge these interactions 568 
begin to address Rudd’s (2014) questions on ‘upland hydrology effects on oceans’ and ‘integrated 569 
upland coastal management’ ranked (24th) and (43rd) overall.  570 
 571 
Examples adapted from The Nature Conservancy’s Marine Conservation Agreements: Practitioner’s Toolkit 
(http://www.mcatoolkit.org/) 
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 572 
5.3.4 Biodiversity conservation 573 
Many turtle populations nest in coastal regions supported by seagrass ecosystems (Cullen-574 
Unsworth and Unsworth 2013). These iconic and charismatic species are increasingly threatened by 575 
poaching and so ensuring healthy nesting populations is vital (Koch et al. 2006). Protecting seagrass 576 
ecosystems may be a cost-effective and financially viable option for sea turtle conservation. Paying 577 
locals to monitor nesting sites and fisherman for releasing live turtles caught in fishing gear 578 
provides a direct and additional income stream for local communities (Ferraro 2009; Mohammed 579 
2012).  In nesting projects locals usually receive two payments: a flat fee for identifying nest 580 
locations; and a variable payment based on hatching success. Successful examples include Natamu 581 
Turtle Watch and Knunga Marine National Reserve Conservation and Development Project in 582 
Kenya and Sea Sense on Mafia Island in Tanzania (Ferraro 2009).  583 
Due to positive willingness to pay (WTP) for sea turtle conservation among citizens of 584 
developed countries (e.g., Rudd 2009), there are also opportunities for developing international PES 585 
schemes that transfer funds from developed countries, where WTP for iconic species conservation 586 
is high, to developing countries where turtle nesting grounds and critical life stages occur. For other 587 
seagrass-dependent iconic species that enjoy an international profile, there may be similar 588 
opportunities as for sea turtles. Seagrass ecosystem conservation and management may thus provide 589 
lessons in how triage decisions for species at risk (ranked 32
nd
, Rudd 2014) are conceptualized and 590 
implemented.     591 
5.3.5 Restoration 592 
Seagrass ecosystems are declining yearly (Unsworth 2014). To reverse this global trend 593 
seagrass restoration (in suitable areas) offers an effective means to rehabilitate carbon stores and 594 
sinks (Duarte et al. 2013c) whilst enhancing other equally important ecosystem services (Greiner et 595 
al. 2013). A recent seagrass restoration CO2 accumulation model, examining long-term trends in 596 
carbon sequestration for several commonly planted seagrass species, demonstrated that at an 597 
optimal density carbon accumulation of 177 to 1337 t CO2 ha
-1
 after 50 years could be achieved 598 
(Duarte et al. 2013c). However, although seagrass restoration has a relatively long history, 599 
particularly in the USA, it still remains limited in scope and success (Fonseca, 2011). Nevertheless, 600 
the importance of restoration activities for coastal management has been highlighted by Rudd 601 
(2014), with the ocean priority research question addressing ‘restoration effectiveness’ ranking 602 
(29
th
). Restoration programs also provide opportunities to generate significant socio-economic 603 
benefits.  604 
However, seagrass restoration costs can be expensive. In the USA, projected costs were 605 
estimated at between US$593,000 and US$970,000 (1996 US$) per hectare (author’s conversion) 606 
once mapping and ground-truthing, planting, monitoring, contracting and government oversight 607 
were included (Fonseca, 2006). In addition, restoration programs suffer from a number of 608 
challenges associated with validation (i.e., monitoring), site selection, artificial colonization 609 
methods, management processes and lack of adequate scientific knowledge regarding seagrass 610 
ecology (Fonseca, 2011). Nonetheless, with respect to restoration program outlays, recent estimates 611 
in Australia have suggested somewhat more feasible restoration costs of between AUS$10,000 and  612 
AUS$629,000 per hectare, with investments in restoration at the lower end implying pay-back times 613 
of  5 years or less (Blandon and zu Ermgassen, 2014). This is further supported by the work of 614 
Duarte et al. (2013c), which suggests that due to the value associated with the sequestered carbon 615 
restoration programs may be able to recover between US$12,000 and US$43,000 ha
-1
 (constant 616 
dollars), enabling the recovery of full program costs where a carbon tax is in place. Furthermore, 617 
most restoration programs are likely to be undertaken in developing countries where capital and 618 
labour costs are much less prohibitive (Duarte et al. 2013c). 619 
The Swahili Seas Mikoko Pamoja project (2010-2013) provides a successful example of a 620 
wetland restoration carbon finance program operating in a developing country context. Active in 621 
Gazi Bay, Kenya, the Mikoko Pamoja project has established a mangrove conservation and 622 
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restoration program focused on the carbon storage value of mangroves to benefit poor coastal 623 
communities. The program operates an accredited Plan Vivo carbon credit scheme providing 624 
US$13,000 annually, which is disbursed to conservation activities and community development 625 
projects. Moreover, since 2012 one of the project partner’s, Earthwatch Institute, has employed 626 
local residents and volunteers to participate in mangrove management and restoration activities 627 
covering over 600 hectares. Finally, the project has also engaged in a number of capacity building 628 
initiatives through the provision of additional training and networking facilities (UNEP and CIFOR 629 
2014). 630 
6 Possibilities for implementing seagrass conservation mechanisms 631 
Deciding on the basic operational parameters for a PES program is only half the challenge; 632 
the other is to consider how broader institutional and governance elements weave together to 633 
influence scheme developments and outcomes: issues that need to be tackled at the design and 634 
implementation stage to ensure lasting results (Lin and Nakamura 2012; Lin and Ueta 2012). 635 
Collectively, these issues are intimately linked to three of the priority research questions identified 636 
by Rudd (2014), namely: ‘management capacity of human communities’ (ranked 56th), transaction 637 
costs of ocean management’ (ranked 57th) and ‘property rights and conservation’ (ranked 66th). 638 
Below we identify some of the most salient issues, incorporating insights from REDD+ and coastal 639 
resource management. As AGEDI (2012:10) note, ‘Blue Carbon and PES project developers have 640 
the opportunity to learn from the challenges and successful outcomes from REDD+ projects that 641 
feature similar project elements’. 642 
6.1 Institutions 643 
Effective institutions are crucial to the successful implementation of incentive schemes and 644 
the resolution of coastal management problems (Rudd et al. 2003; Imperial 2005; Schomers and 645 
Matzdorf 2013; Somorin et al. 2014). In the process of establishing effective institutions the 646 
development of institutional flexibility is particularly important, as this enables programs to respond 647 
adaptively over time to changing circumstances and thus maintain their efficacy (Larson and Soto 648 
2008; Murdiyario et al. 2012). Securing institutional flexibility requires program arrangements that 649 
foster active connections and relations between actors, strong leadership and feedbacks in learning 650 
systems (Cox et al. 2011; Legrand et al. 2013; Geist and Howlett 2014).  651 
In order to deliver these, programs need to be based on a platform of transparency, 652 
accountability and inclusivity (Lockwood et al. 2010; Larsen et al. 2011; Ingram et al. 2014). These 653 
aspects function as enabling properties, and the evidence clearly indicates that a lack of 654 
transparency and accountability can seriously impair institutional capacity and effectiveness 655 
(Somorin et al. 2014), whilst also undermining social capital (Rudd et al. 2003; Shiferaw et al. 656 
2008). In addition, programs that fail to consider the issue of inclusivity can ultimately disempower 657 
participant groups, and as a consequence, embed benefit sharing inequalities between households 658 
and communities (Krause et al. 2013).  659 
6.2 Stakeholders and Participation 660 
Devolving decision-making to stakeholder groups can be enormously beneficial (Larson and 661 
Soto 2008), at once enhancing and strengthening intra-community ties as well as a sense of 662 
common identity (Rudd et al. 2003). Conversely, centralized administration can often stifle local-663 
scale innovations and the development of shared visions (Pokorny et al. 2013). Programs need to 664 
engage and connect with local stakeholders in order to maximise participation, which is central to 665 
providing effective management (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006). Doing so legitimises decision-666 
making and empowers individual and collective agency enabling the design process to align with, 667 
and support, local norms, values and beliefs (Kawowski et al. 2011; Brooks et al. 2012; Corbera 668 
2012; Bremer and Glavovic 2013). This is essential for participant commitment (Murdiyario et al. 669 
2012; Davenport and Seekamp 2013) and acknowledges the relevance for effective governance of 670 
local users’ knowledge (Andersson et al. 2014).  671 
These processes can be supported by clarifying stakeholder roles and responsibilities and 672 
promoting leadership (Chhatre et al. 2012; Dent 2012). Leadership, and especially local leadership, 673 
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has been shown to be fundamental to delivering successful coastal management (Sutton and Rudd 674 
2014). Finally, it is important to acknowledge how participation is framed in the context of power 675 
relations, as these can represent potent forces capable of distorting the meaningful involvement, 676 
agency and legitimacy of grassroots actors (Dewulf et al. 2011; Cook et al. 2013).  677 
6.3 Tenure and property rights 678 
Ownership in developing countries is often complicated by overlapping formal and informal 679 
(customary) tenure and rights-based arrangements (Awono et al 2014; Resosudarmo et al 2014; 680 
Rights and Resources 2014; Sunderlin et al. 2014). Clearly defining, legitimising and enabling 681 
functioning property rights systems is essential for operationalizing incentive programs (Lockie 682 
2013). Such clarifications are critical for conditional payments where knowing who to pay (i.e., the 683 
right holder) and who is accountable for delivering project-level outcomes is necessary (Visseren-684 
Hamakers et al. 2012; Duchelle et al. 2014; Sunderlin et al. 2014). Functioning tenure and rights-685 
based systems also provide the framework to enforce property rights, securing contracts (Naughton-686 
Treves and Wendland 2014) and combating weak governance (Resosudarmo et al. 2014).  687 
This is particularly pertinent to coastal marine environments where complications 688 
concerning tenure, rights designations and authority are a direct challenge to introducing and 689 
enforcing incentive schemes (Mohammed 2012), a state of affairs clearly linked to the ambiguities 690 
regarding property rights in coastal areas and the variety of users and user interests (Cicin-Sain, 691 
1993). As part of the design process it is crucial to mitigate potential mismatches arising between 692 
the provision, delivery and bundle of property rights to reduce the likelihood of marine resource 693 
conflicts developing (Yandle 2007), as well as to ensure that poorer sectors are not marginalised or 694 
power asymmetries and social inequalities reinforced (WRI 2005; Fisher et al. 2008). 695 
6.4 Benefit sharing 696 
Distributing benefits and costs in a fair and equitable way is a fundamental aspect of 697 
delivering socially acceptable incentive schemes (McDermott et al. 2012). Traditionally, equity 698 
concerns have been side-lined in favour of a greater emphasis and focus on efficiency maximization 699 
(Pascual et al. 2010; Narloch et al. 2013). However, this trade-off can produce socially undesirable 700 
outcomes (Asquith et al. 2008). Incorporating social parameters in the targeting of schemes in order 701 
to widen access and participation whilst reducing the marginalization of poorer communities 702 
represents an important first step in reversing these potential trade-offs (Mahanty et al. 2011). These 703 
processes need to proceed in tandem with beneficiary identification and the evaluation of the 704 
potential socio-economic ramifications of ES provision and distribution (Willemen et al. 2013). 705 
Additional considerations for effective benefit sharing include legitimising decision-making 706 
processes via legal and procedural avenues (Murdiyario et al. 2012); adjusting compensation levels 707 
according to the capacity needs of individuals, households and communities (Mohammed 2012); 708 
and addressing the potential socio-economic impacts of programs on non-participants (Huang et al. 709 
2009). 710 
6.5 Delivering ecosystem services, monitoring and compliance  711 
The central tenant of incentive schemes relates the provision of specified outputs to 712 
agreement obligations and payments (Ferraro 2008; Wunder et al. 2008). Consequently, monitoring 713 
and compliance represent key contractual conditions for programs to deliver their principal 714 
objectives (Hejnowicz et al. 2014). These can be distilled into four broad areas:  715 
First, measuring ES provision (Porras et al. 2013).  This reduces the likelihood of producing 716 
a false picture of service provision, and provides a scientifically robust case for PES program design 717 
(Hejnowicz et al. 2014). It has been suggested that even though coastal systems may be data poor, 718 
there is sufficient knowledge of the management activities that improve resource protection and ES 719 
provision (Lau, 2013). Second, evaluating scheme additionality and demonstrating ‘added value’ by 720 
addressing the links between management interventions and program delivery (Ghazoul et al. 721 
2010). Validating additionality requires baseline data, suitable metrics and performance indicators 722 
plus the targeting of PES to locations likely to maximize program benefits (Sommerville et al. 723 
2011; Wünscher and Engel, 2012; Lau, 2013).  724 
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Third, assessing potential of spill-over effects (i.e., leakage) resulting from program 725 
implementation that may offset additionality gains (Engel et al. 2008; Porras et al. 2013). Fourth, 726 
monitoring contract conditionality and ensuring compliance (Ferraro 2008). This requires 727 
establishing who is monitoring (i.e. users, communities or officials) and how frequently 728 
(Sommerville et al. 2011), providing sufficient payments to programme participants (Porras et al. 729 
2013), and ensuring agreements are long-term arrangements with enforceable penalties for breaches 730 
of contract (Ferraro 2008; Wunder et al. 2008). All have substantive effects on transaction costs of 731 
governance (ranked 57
th
, Rudd 2014) and will influence the long-term viability of PES structures. 732 
6.6 Costs and funding 733 
The viability of PES programs relies upon consistent and sufficient financial flows, both in 734 
the short-term (i.e., covering costs needed to initiate and implement a project) and the long-term 735 
(i.e., securing the funds necessary to sustain an active project), without which lasting transformative 736 
change cannot be achieved (Hejnowicz et al. 2014). Programs need to be designed so that they 737 
sustain themselves through self-generated revenues (Pirard et al. 2010). An added complication for 738 
seagrass PES schemes is that monitoring and enforcement in marine and coastal environments may 739 
require extra technical and specialist equipment not needed in the terrestrial sphere, adding 740 
significantly to program outlays (Lau, 2013). Securing long-term funding that reduces fiscal 741 
constraints but is not overly reliant on external donor funding is particularly important (Bennett et 742 
al. 2013; Fauzi and Anna 2013; Hein et al. 2013). Achieving both these objectives requires 743 
adequately accounting for the full range of transaction costs, which in some cases may be 744 
prohibitive for PES development (McCann et al. 2005; Marshall 2013; McCann 2013). 745 
7 Conclusions 746 
Seagrass ecosystems provide an array of globally and locally significant ecosystem services. 747 
From the perspective of climate change, it is their carbon sequestration and storage potential that is 748 
most attractive. Seagrass ecosystems are also home to diverse marine life that can directly or 749 
indirectly support the artisanal and commercial fisheries that help maintain resilience in human 750 
communities. In addition, they also play an important role in the conservation and maintenance of 751 
marine biological diversity and influence national or international non-market benefits deriving 752 
from endangered species such as sea turtles (Rudd 2009). We have examined the prospects for 753 
financing seagrass conservation under a purely carbon approach and in conjunction with PES 754 
schemes that could help capture the benefits derived from multiple ecosystem services beyond 755 
carbon sequestration.  756 
The prospects for developing a pure carbon credit scheme remain slim, especially if targeted 757 
at the regulatory carbon market. Opportunities exist, however, for voluntary carbon market schemes 758 
and these are far more promising. However, the instability of the voluntary carbon market and the 759 
impact this has on carbon prices makes a purely carbon-based approach questionable; fluctuating 760 
carbon prices mean projects cannot guarantee financial returns on investment or  adequate payments 761 
to meet participants’ needs. Nonetheless, voluntary carbon standards are channelling more effort 762 
into delivering co-benefits and, from this perspective, seagrass PES schemes may be highly 763 
complementary. Adopting a combined strategy would maximize conservation and livelihood 764 
outcomes so long as the design, implementation and institutional issues previously highlighted were 765 
adequately dealt with. 766 
Providing the scientific evidence base for complex incentive schemes is challenging. This is 767 
particularly so with Blue Carbon systems where there remain many ecological, social and economic 768 
knowledge gaps that need to be negotiated in order to develop functional payment programs. 769 
However, we have mapped out what those potential knowledge gaps are in relation to seagrass 770 
ecosystems, in terms of basic ecosystem function-service information, ecosystem service valuation 771 
and research concerning the governance structures and apparatus through which incentive schemes 772 
would need to operate. In so doing we have highlighted the importance and complexity of seagrass 773 
ecosystems and the value of conserving them. At the same time we have clearly identified how by 774 
conserving these systems, particularly through the use of innovative financial incentive 775 
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mechanisms, we are also contributing to a broader set of significant global ocean priority research 776 
challenges. 777 
Overall, a wide range of opportunities exist for including seagrass meadows in local PES 778 
schemes to combat climate change, secure seagrass conservation and enhance coastal community 779 
development. However, realizing the ‘true’ potential of seagrass meadows requires international 780 
cooperation on two fronts: combating the threats that currently imperil the integrity of functioning 781 
seagrass ecosystems and including them in formal climate change policies such as REDD+. In this 782 
respect challenges and barriers remain but promising progress is being made; efforts to protect and 783 
rehabilitate seagrass ecosystems are crucial because of their widespread distribution, their central 784 
role in supporting functional coastal environments and the human communities that rely on those 785 
systems. 786 
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Figure S1. Diagrammatic representation of the ecosystem service economic valuation components and 
their relationship to each other. Adapted from Vo et al. (2012) and TEEB (2012) 
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Table S1. Economic valuation methodologies and their associated pros and cons 
Valuation 
Approach 
Valuation Methodology Advantages and Disadvantages of Valuation 
Techniques 
Market Cost Avoided Cost: ES valued on the basis of costs 
avoided i.e. prohibiting the degradation or 
damage of environmental benefits 
 
Production Function: value of ecological 
function with regards to economic output 
effects. Changes in ES quality and quantity on 
human-wellbeing 
Mismatches can arise between the likely benefits of 
intervention compared to original benefits leading 
to misleading WTP results. Applies the 
precautionary principle. Can estimate indirect-use 
benefits  
 
Not able to assess non-use values. Difficult to 
derive data about changes in ES. Widely employed 
in the contexts of coastal and wetland ecosystems 
Market Price Market: based on Willingness to Pay (WTP) Requires market data (questionable reliability), and 
policies may distort market prices. However, 
market prices reflect personal WTP and market 
price data is relatively easy to obtain 
 
Revealed 
Preference 
Travel Cost: survey method valuing site-based 
facilities. WTP for environmental benefits at 
particular locations  
 
Hedonic Pricing: valuations based on implied 
WTP via purchases in related markets – mainly 
labour and property 
The method is data intensive, it does not estimate 
non-use values and complex journeys are 
problematical. However, it is widely used and used 
in developing countries for assessing ecotourism  
 
The method is data intensive, it does not estimate 
non-use values, and income-level restricts choices 
whilst surrogate markets must be a good reflection 
of values. However it can value the impact of some 
ES on land values  
 
 
Stated 
Preference 
Contingent Valuation: WTP or WTA 
compensation for alterations in ES. Respondents 
can name an amount they would pay (classical 
CV), or are asked to say whether they would 
pay a specific amount (di/polychotomous 
choice) or select an amount from several options 
(Choice Modelling).  
Choice modelling: involves more elaborate sets 
of scenarios (or choices) from which participant 
select their preferred alternatives based on a set 
of choice attributes. Choices are constructed to 
reveal the marginal rate of substitution between 
a specific attribute and the trade-off item. 
Contingent Valuation: this method suffers from 
several sources of bias, inconsistent preferences, it 
is costly and labour intensive to develop and 
implement and can miss non-trivial information. 
However, it is able to estimate option and existence 
values. 
 
Choice Modelling: hypothetical bias and the 
choices can be complex where attribute numbers 
are high. However, compared to standard CV the 
experimenter has much more control, the statistics 
are more robust, attribute range is greater and the 
method suffers less from respondent strategic 
behaviour. 
Value 
Transfer 
Benefit Transfer: transference of values at one 
location (study site) to another location (policy 
site) of which there are four types: unit BT, 
adjusted BT, value function transfer and meta-
analytic transfer 
Large number of uncertainties not wholly 
accounted for between study and policy locations. 
Transfer of values from one context to another is 
difficult. Nevertheless, it is a quick and cheap 
method. 
Participatory 
Valuation 
Deliberative valuation: combines states 
preference methods with deliberative processes 
from political science, involving small groups of 
participants in reflective iterative dialogues. 
Less bias encountered compared to standard stated 
preference methods. Values are constructed in a 
social process. Inclusive of all stakeholder groups, 
but depending on the power-relations of 
stakeholders involved some value preferences may 
be articulated more forcefully than others. 
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Non-monetary 
Deliberative 
and 
Participatory 
Approaches  
Focus groups, Participatory Action Research 
(PAR), Health-based, Q-methodology: These 
are a set of group-based methods that are both 
participatory and deliberative, and seek to 
obtain information regarding human-nature 
relationships. PARs were developed specifically 
for use in developing countries to elicit local 
knowledge and enable local people to 
participate in decision-making. Health-based 
measures relate valuations to factors that affect 
quality of life and human-wellbeing. Q-
methodology is a means of assessing the 
subjectivity of people’s views and values. 
Overall, these methods are able to provide values 
regarding biodiversity, provisioning, regulating and 
cultural services, and they enrich the qualitative 
components of value. Although they require literate 
participants, new data collection, trained 
individuals and can be affected by local nuances. 
However, protocols can be adjusted to illiterate 
individuals; values can be aggregated to the scale 
required and in some cases they can be relatively 
straightforward to undertake. Furthermore, they 
engage a wide-range of stakeholders and are 
conveyable to policy makers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Mendelsohn and Olmstead (2009), Lui et al. (2010), Pascual and Muradian et al. (2010), Turner et al. 
(2010), Christie et al. (2012) and Liekens et al. (2014) 
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Table S2. Examples of PES schemes that jointly focus on carbon management and the provision of 
additional ecosystem services 
PES Study PES Description 
Carbon 
Livelihoods 
Project: 
Mozambique 
 
Source: Hedge and 
Bull (2011) and 
Groom and Palmer 
(2012) 
The project operated across several villages and aimed to establish a viable alternative livelihood, 
agro-forestry and carbon credit scheme. Agroforestry was designed to generate carbon offsets 
alongside new ‘on-farm’ labour activities, whilst the alternative livelihood element promoted 
‘off-farm’ micro-enterprises.  Initially funded by the European Union, the programme became 
self-financing following sales of verified emissions reductions (VERs) in the voluntary carbon 
market.  VER sales were used to establish an annual PES fund that dispensed payments to farmers 
over a seven year period. Remaining revenue was channelled into a community trust fund for 
development projects such as healthcare support. Adoption of agro-forestry practices meant 
households generated new ‘on-farm’ income by selling crops or harvesting non-timber forest 
products following cessation of carbon payments. Micro-enterprises such as bee-keeping, plant 
nurseries, carpentry and even a community sawmill provided viable and secure alternative 
revenue sources for farmers. In addition, some local people were hired by the project. 
  
Criticisms: Carbon offset payments were less important (proportionally) than income from the 
project’s alternative revenue sources. Micro-enterprises potentially undermined the sustainability 
of ‘on-farm’ activities through changes in labour allocation. Gender discrimination contributed to 
uneven income distribution between male- and female-headed households, and project costs were 
significant; with two thirds of carbon offset sales revenue directed towards overheads. 
 
Western Kenya 
Integrated 
Ecosystem 
Management 
Programme 
(WKIEMP): Kenya 
 
Source: World 
Bank (2010) 
WKIEMP was initiated to provide a viable community-livelihood development model. 
Implemented across 15 micro-watersheds WKIEMP focused on land productivity and 
sustainable-use by supporting on-farm and off-farm conservation strategies and building 
institutional capacity; alongside promoting management interventions geared towards 
biodiversity and carbon sequestration and storage. Overall the project was moderately successful. 
Households did not receive payment; but derived income through improved land productivity, 
livelihood diversification and technical capacity. Estimated net present value to participating 
households is considered to be US$1193 to US$2844. Moreover, 60% of beneficiary households 
reported an increase in food production and consumption directly addressing poverty alleviation. 
Furthermore, the project established institutional networks to enhance the sustainability of 
community activities following project cessation such as basin technical committees that 
promoted cross-collaboration.  
 
Criticisms: Two problems undermined WKIEMP’s notion of sustainability. First, project 
permanency: the project ran for only five years from 2005 to 2010. Second, the programme 
encountered fiscal constraints that hampered its implementation and operation leading to 
disjointed upstream and downstream management interventions. Overall, the failure to secure 
adequate co-financing of funds significantly impaired project performance. 
 
Socio Bosque: 
Ecuador 
 
Source: de Koning 
et al. (2011) and 
Krasue and Loft 
(2013) 
Socio Bosque is a nationwide government initiative designed to realise biodiversity conservation, 
climate mitigation and poverty alleviation benefits. Participants receive direct monetary transfers 
on a per hectare basis for protecting native forests and ecosystems through voluntary but 
monitored twenty year conservation agreements. Payments are made on a descending scale, with 
amounts reduced incrementally as the land enrolled increases providing a built-in equity 
mechanism. Participants are individual landowners or local indigenous communities, and so land 
is privately or communally owned. Only land that has a high probability of deforestation, 
sufficient carbon storage, water regulation and biodiversity capacity and is found in relatively 
socially-deprived areas is eligible for enrolment. Overall 260000 Ha yr-1 of forest have been 
protected.  Remuneration is conditional, requiring compliance with a social investment plan 
(directing how incentives might best be used to improve social conditions) and conservation 
obligations. Social benefits are realised through monetary investments in health, education, 
household consumption, debt repayments, infrastructure and institutional capacity.  
 
Criticisms: Payments allocated to participants are not equal: less than a fifth of households in 
community agreements receive more than US$500 yr-1 compared to 92% of private landholders. 
The scheme has underperformed with regards to distributing individual and collective contracts in 
a way that accounts for the number of beneficiaries per contract and their poverty status. 
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